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Law speaks in generalities, literature in exceptions. This maxim holds, as most 
commonplaces, besides some truths also much that is untrue. To start with some 
falsities, legal adjudication would aim at deciding particular cases, whereas high 
literature is said to expose the human condition. But in legal adjudication, the 
particular is framed in terms of rights and principles that claim to have general or 
universal validity, whereas in literature it is through the vicissitudes of individual 
man that mankind is portrayed.  
Although the generalities of law undoubtedly originated from the experiences of 
individual man, legal systems tend to detach from the particularities of men, and 
form an order, or nomos, in themselves, with their own rationality and rhetoric that 
is able to justify even the most inhuman institutions and enterprises.  
The significance of literature for law resides in the particularity of its substance. In 
literature, the rhetoric of universality is framed in exemplars. It is through 
exemplars that much of the universal truisms of law and politics are unmasked as 
the exclusionary rhetoric of particular communities.  
Literary exemplars include the Divina Commedia (Dante), Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe), Max Havelaar (1860, Multatuli) and Les Bienveillantes 
(2008, Jonathan Littell). 
 
 
1 Introduction: the poetics of law 
 
Two phenomena that boast to have perennial value are distinctive European from 
origin: its literature and its legal institutions.  
Let’s start with the eldest heritage: European literature spans more than 
two and an half millennia, connecting the Greek to the present. Although all 
cultures have bred great poetry and epics, the Greek created the tragedy, that 
form of “mimicking the world” as Aristotle characterizes the arts, which focuses on 
character and motives rather than on action. The dramatization of a conflict 
became possible by extending the number of actors. According to Aristotle, 
Aeschylos increased the number of actors to two, and made the dialogue take the 
leading part in the play, whereas a third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles.1 
Just as in their sculpture and philosophy, the genuine topic of the tragedy is not 
myth or narrative, but the portrayal of individual man in his misery and glory. The 
setting of three actors and a chorus proved to be fully equipped to act out the 
heroic and tragic choices of the heroes and heroines. Despite their noble or even 
divine descent, they were human enough to identify with, and to evoke in the 
audience, as Aristotle coined it, catharsis – purgation, purification, or clarification 
of the soul.2  
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The influence of the Greek tragedies on European literature has been 
enormous. Since the Renaissance, the tragedies were essential readings at the 
grammar schools. They not only served as the gateway to the repository of antique 
deities and heroes that populated the theatres, opera’s and the ceilings of the 
palaces of those days, but, more importantly, moulded the European mind to 
address the vicissitudes of human life through the lens of the inner life of its 
protagonists. Via their Roman imitators, they inspired a new generation of poets in 
Spain, France and England, who equal their Greek predecessors in depth and 
broadness of scope. 
The invention of print furthered the rise of the novel, which does not 
depend on public performances, but could be read in private. The nineteenth 
century is the age of the great novels – Le Père Goriot, Madame Bovary, Anna 
Karenina, The Brothers Karamazov, and Emma, to mention a few of the list of 
hundreds of master pieces, a list that carries on up till the present. They offer a 
parallel universe, as rich as our four dimensional one, in which the rich and 
perplexing depth of the soul is explored. In these works, a whole menagerie of 
poisoners, swindlers, adulteresses and misers pass, offering a comédie humaine 
which so often ends up in tragedy. 
A different comédie humaine takes place at the stage of the courthouse. 
Here, a similar stream of swindlers, adulteresses and misers passes the bench. But 
in court, they are examined through the distant lens of the impersonal law rather 
than through the loupe of dramatists and poets, who zoom in on the particularities 
and uniqueness of the individual psyche and experience. The law holds for classes 
of persons and actions, indifferent to private differences that would catch the 
dramatist’s eye. The generality of the law guarantees that the citizen is subjected 
to rules rather than to rulers.3 Before the law, all are equal. This explains that 
equality is considered to be an attribute of justice. Pericles, in his funeral speech 
(431 BC), explicitly links justice to equality: 
 
If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if 
no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class 
considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty 
bar the way.4 
 
The principle of equality became a revolutionary concept in the French Revolution 
as part of the slogan Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité (1789). The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (art. 6) defined the principle in a way that 
reiterates Pericles’ definition: 
 
[The law] must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, 
being equal in its eyes, shall be equally eligible to all high offices, public positions 
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and employments, according to their ability, and without other distinction than 
that of their virtues and talents. 
 
The principle recurs, albeit in a more succinct drafting, in article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states: 
 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a small document. It consists of a 
humble 30 articles that claim to hold for all human beings. But this document, with 
its universal appeal, forms the basis of a multitude of treaties, which elaborate the 
basic idea behind the Declaration: that human nature is the same and equal 
everywhere, despite the differences in race, culture, religion or gender. Those 
treaties, in turn, demand the governments to transpose the rights that the treaty 
seeks to promote into law, that is, into a coherent body of rules, which safeguards 
the equal treatment of those subjected to it through the generality of its precepts.  
A revolutionary idea that started in a city-state – Athens – became the 
leading principle in a series of nations, and finished up its triumphal progress as the 
world’s principal ideal. Compliance with the human rights has become the criterion 
for justice, whereas severe violations of the human rights are a sufficient reason 
for international intervention. The triumph of the universal rights of man opposes 
the decline of the fascist and totalitarian ideologies, which favours a particular 
people, a particular race, a particular ideology, or a particular religion.  
The law, it seems, is Europe’s most successful export product. It is a way of 
organising society that warrants a minimum of morality by the mere fact that it 
consists of rules rather than commands, issued by a central organ, and applied by 
an independent judiciary. These elements are the consequences of what Lon Fuller 
coined the internal morality of the law – the morality that makes law possible – 
and which consists of values such as clarity of law, consistency, the ban on 
retroactive laws, congruence between official action and rules, and, of course, the 
generality of the law.5 These aspects were discussed and developed in Europe and 
the American colonies ever since the 17th century and became the standard after 
the French revolution.  
Although literature is unsurpassed in unravelling the lives and drives of 
individual man, its language of particularity and individuality is far apart from the 
language that the law speaks. The aspirations of justice that the law seeks to 
realize explain the generality of its commands, its impersonal character, and its 
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Can literature teach us what justice is? When Dante arrives in the second hellfire, 
where the cursed souls are perpetually swept along in the outer darkness by a 
howling whirlwind, he asks Vergil permission to talk with two of them, swirling in 
the air. These are the souls of Francesca and Paolo, killed by Francesca’s husband 
when he caught them in their adultery. How did they realize, Dante asked, that 
they were in love? Then Francesca answered that, when they were together and 
read about the impossible love of Lancelot for Guinevere, they suddenly realized 
what they unconsciously felt all the time, so that when they arrived at the section 
where Lancelot kissed Guinevere, Francesca was kissed by Paolo “while he 
trembles all over”.7   
Dante seems cruel, writes Borges, by condemning Francesca to her 
punishment. But he is not the hyena, making verses among the tombs, as the other 
poet-philosopher, Nietzsche, viciously but with unsurpassed expressivity remarks.8 
From the verses, said Borges, speaks an infinite pity with the fate of the two lovers. 
But Dante’s feelings do not always coincide with the judgment of God. For there 
are unpardonable, capital sins:  
 
For each he selects a person who has committed that sin. But in each there may be 
something admirable or worthy. Francesca and Paolo are not merely voluptuaries. 
They have committed no other sin, but one is enough to condemn them.9 
 
One wrong step suffices for Dante’s god to condemn the adulterer. In his verses, 
divine justice demonstrates to be strict and relentless, as rigorous as Kant’s moral 
law, which determines the moral character of an act on the basis of just one 
criterion – to act out of duty, not inclination.10 But whereas man is a free creature 
in Kant’s universe, God’s omnipotence raises the problem of free will. In this 
respect, the divine judgments seem to be incomprehensible rather than just. That 
is what the decrees of the god of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob have in common with 
those of other gods, who seal the fate of the poor mortal even before his birth, and 
impose him with the burden of an irreversible offence against the world order. 
What blame attaches to Oedipus, we ask ourselves, who unwittingly killed his 
father and married his mother Iocaste? He cut out his eyes and was banished from 
Thebe, whereas his mother hung herself. To us, these punishments, whether or not 
inflicted by themselves, seem to be unfair and barbaric. But we, of course, live in 
different times, with a different Weltanschauung or worldview. I can imagine the 
question of the average student – and his model: the average lawyer: “What 
benefit has it to study literary works such as Oedipus Rex and the Divina 
Commedia? What can we learn from them? – except then that it reveals that the 
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morality of the early era’s diverges from ours, and that we may be lucky to live in 
times that hold such sound moral opinions.  
 
 
3 Universal principles in local perspective 
 
The law speaks in rules, literature in exceptions. This maxim holds, as most 
commonplaces, besides some truths also much that is untrue. Let’s start with some 
truths. 
 In 1776, the following words were issued in the Declaration of 
Independence: 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among them 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
 
‘All men are created equal’ – what did the founding fathers have in mind when 
they expressed this revolutionary idea that a continent incited to rebellion against 
the then superpower England? At least, the black and Asiatic fellow men fall 
outside the category of equals, as well as half of the Caucasian population. 
According to current international law, the fight against the Indians would be 
qualified as genocide. If a country would apply a similar concept of equality 
nowadays, it would probably be reason for the present descendants of these 
colonists to liberate the population of that country under the slogan of ‘Enduring 
Freedom’. 
 And yet… we do not call into question the sincerity of the framers of the 
American constitution. What we experience to be a blatant breach of reason, by 
generously releasing all people first, and subsequently withholding equality to the 
vast majority of mankind in one fluent movement, is the result of an evolution in 
our thought of what makes up the essence of man. When a particular specimen – 
the eighteenth-century gentleman and a few dead Greek and Roman – is 
considered to be the true blooming of man, than those who deviate from the 
knowledge, manners and religion of this species will be experienced as a less 
developed mode of mankind, which obviously cannot exercise the full rights of 
man – just as children do not dispose of the rights of adults. That is not necessarily 
irrational, inconsistent, or hypocrite, but the result of a worldview that gives colour 
and content to this abstract ideal. 
  The colonists were not unique in their privileged understanding of the 
universal values. In the Netherlands of the 19th century, the universal Christian 
values were understood in a manner as exclusive as the Declaration of 
Independence in the early 19th century. In the novel Max Havelaar, a biting satire 
of, and charge on, the Dutch colonial regime in the Netherlands Indies of those 
days, Multatuli brings in the personage of Batavus Droogstoppel, one of the main 
characters of the book, and representing the narrow-minded class of Dutch 
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merchants.11 Droogstoppel quotes with approval a preach of minister Blatherer, 
who regards the New Testament from the prospect of financial profit: 
 
For Blatherer himself has said that God ordains everything in such way that right-
mindedness leads to riches. ‘Lo and behold!’ says he, ‘is there not much wealth in 
Holland? That is because we have the Faith. Are not battle, murder and sudden 
death the order of the day in France? That is because they are Catholics. Are not 
the Javanese poor? They are heathens. The longer the Dutch have to do with the 
Javanese, the more wealth there will be here and the more poverty there will be 
there. It is God’s will that it should be so!12 
 
Droogstoppel and Blatherer are, of course, the products of Multatuli’s pungent 
satire, but the Max Havelaar wouldn’t have been immortal if the readers had not 
recognized them in their fellow-citizens. The worldview of the Droogstoppels and 
Blatherers is one of dichotomies: 
 
Frits says the Javanese are not heathens, but I call anyone a heathen who has the 
wrong faith. For I hold to Jesus Christ, and Him crucified, and I have no doubt 
every respectable reader does the same.13  
 
In order to prevent that the heathens will end up in hell (follows: an illustrative 
depiction of the horrifying punishments in the eternal Gehenna), God, in His 
incomprehensible wisdom, granted His beloved Holland sovereignty over millions 
of children of the repudiated son of Noach. By having the Javanese labouring for 
Holland, his soul could be captured for the kingdom of God:  
 
Isn’t it clearly the finger of God, who makes the wicket labour to preserve the just? 
(…) Isn’t that why we’re told to ‘work and pray’, meaning that we should pray and 
have the work done by that black scum which doesn’t know its ‘Our Father’?14  
 
The New Testament, message of love and tolerance, is also a militant book by 
which the submission of the overseas empires was justified. 
 That is the hallmark of abstract principles and Glad Tidings: every course of 
action can be made out to accord with them.15 Its ‘pray and labour’ can be read in 
Droogstoppel’s way, a reading that enables the merchants to listen to Blatherer’s 
preach on Sunday while the Javanese labours, but it can also be understood as 
Havelaar did, the hero of Multatuli’s novel, whose night-time labour substituted his 
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prayers. And the slogan ‘all men are created equal’ did not restrain Jefferson, who 
contributed so much to the Declaration of Independence, from keeping hundreds 
of slaves, although it also inspired Lincoln’s ‘Gettysburg Address’. Each appeal to 
their guiding principle has primarily rhetoric value. For when we invoke a principle, 
we appeal to a way of life. And forms of life are not abstract, but specific and 
concrete, fed by incidents and examples. The import of literature for law lies in the 





Who is the Javanese? For Droogstoppel, the Javanese is the Other, the degrée zéro, 
whose enormous defect it is not to be Droogstoppel. That has the Javanese in 
common with ordinary people, such as Havelaar, who has debts and lives on a 
garret together with wife and child. Such people are nameless and obscure, just as 
Havelaar remains nameless for Droogstoppel, who persists to call him Scarfman. 
Without a name, one lacks a history too. And without a history, an individual is 
interchangeable with another one. The Javanese, those are the others, the subjects 
of the territories overseas, the heathens to be converted and the rebellious 
natives, the balancing item of the credit balance-policy of the Netherlands in the 
East Indies. 
 In the frame story of the Max Havelaar, Multatuli interweaves the tale of 
Saïdja and Adinda, two native children. It is the tale of greedy districts heads, 
stolen buffalo’s and harsh colonial laws. It is the tale of refugee peasants and the 
Dutch colonial army that kills the rebels and razed hamlets. It is, as Multatuli 
assures, a monotonous tale. But it is also a tale of love. It is described from the 
perspective of Saïdja, a native boy with a name, a history, and dreams about a 
future with Adinda. But a future he did not have, because he finds the mangled 
body of Adinda at last and throws himself on the fixed-bayonets of the Dutch army.  
  Saïdja’s dreams do not differ largely from those of Droogstoppel’s sons: his 
love for Adinda matches Romeo’s love for Judith; and his bravery equals that of a 
Homeric hero. Through this tale, Multatuli demonstrates that this coloured native 
boy, who hasn’t been schooled, but ploughed the paddy fields with his buffalo, 
does not differ from us. Not the differences – skin, religion, class – are 
fundamental, but the similarities – the capacity to love, to dream, to create, and to 
suffer. The tale of Saïdja moves, because we ourselves could have been Saïdja.16 
 Eight years before, another, more influential book was published, Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin by Harriet Beecher Stowe, “the little lady who started this great war”, 
as Lincoln would have remarked when he met her in 1862.17 This comment is 
probably apocryphal and ignores that slavery, already abolished in the Northern 
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States at the beginning of the 19th century, had been a long-standing source of 
conflict between North and South. Nevertheless, the book had contributed 
considerably to the awakening of the general public of the degrading position of 
the slaves, and furthered the spirit of confrontation. A novel succeeded, where the 
pamphlets of the Quakers and the societies failed. By regarding the world through 
the eyes of a few slaves with a name, a miserable lot, and heartless masters, we 
can identify with them. This, it seems to me, is literature’s major contribution to 
our education: it enables us to put ourselves in someone else’s position, and in this 
way become conscious of the many manifestations of man – and, sometimes, of 
the injustice we, more or less consciously, admit. It widens our horizon, as we 
share, albeit for a brief moment, the experiences of someone we are not, yet could 
have been. 
 The latter is, nonetheless, less obvious than it seems. The 19th century 
reader could easily identify with the aristocrat Pierre of Tolstoi’s War and Peace, or 
with a lady like Madame Bovary, for they were like these personages: white, 
literary men and women, with similar emotions, sensitivities and judgments due to 
the ether of the European culture in which they moved. It is difficult to imagine the 
huge step the civilized, Christian European had to make to identify with an illiterate 
black slave or Javanese, who allegedly stood far below him or her qua race, culture 
and religion. In this respect, our thought has developed considerably the past 
century, not in the least because of the horrific experiences during the Second 
World War. In the occupied territories, even the elite found at their cost what it 
means to be second-class citizens – or less than that. Thanks to allied bombing, 
German terror, and frugal rations, everybody could take a look at humanity under 
the veneer of bourgeois civilization, and people from all walks of life proved to be 
surprisingly similar.  
 Nowadays, we are brought up with the idea of fundamental equality. At 
elementary school we read a children’s version of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and at 
Secundary School the moving tale of Saïdja and Adinda. Then we weep for the 
harsh fate of Uncle Tom, and are moved by Saïdjah’s lot. And one wonders, given 
our identification with the poor and helpless, whether we can become even more 





How human is the monstrous slaughterer? This question urges itself upon us when 
we read The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell. “Oh my human brothers,” begins Dr. 
Max Aue his narrative, “let me tell you how it happened.”18 That is the start of the 
horrific tale about the war on the east front, where Hauptsturmführer of the SS Dr. 
Max Aue is closely associated with the chaotic start of the slaughtering in Poland 
and the Ukraine, and afterwards with the Endlösung in the extermination camps. 
The second line runs: “I am not your brother, you’ll retort, and I don’t want to 
know.” Aue’s reply on this imaginary objection is interesting: 
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Those who kill are humans, just like those who are killed, that’s what’s terrible. 
You can never say: I shall never kill, that’s impossible; the most you can say is: I 
hope I shall never kill. I too hoped so, I too wanted to live a good and useful life, to 
be a man among men, equal to others, I too wanted to add my brick to our 
common house.19  
 
And he finishes his introduction with an appeal to the central idea of the human 
rights, the fundamental equality of all man: 
 
[M]y sincerity was betrayed and placed at the services of an ultimately evil and 
corrupt work, and I crossed over the dark shores, and all this evil entered my own 
life, and none of this all can be made whole, ever… I live, I do what can be done, 
it’s the same for everyone, I am a man like other men, I am a man like you. I tell 
you I am just like you!20 
 
But this appeal to a fundamental equality between the SS-officer who took part in 
the Endlösung with full conviction and us, who condemn this madness from the 
bottom of our hearts, sounds false and deceptive. But Littell pulls the reader very 
skilfully into the madness of the Holocaust, just as the ordinary Wehrmacht-soldier 
was drawn into it, inch by inch, from the execution of the first groups of armed 
Jews, rebels and Bolsheviks behind the lines, till the transports of men, women and 
children to the execution camps. Littell convincingly demonstrates that not 
everyone who took part in the massacre was predestined to be a slaughterer. It is a 
process that took place in stages. After the first step (the killing of enemies as part 
of hostilities), most soldiers will go one step further when pressed (the execution 
of rebels) – to found themselves, at last, in a position that defies all description. 
Only afterwards, when all steps have been wiped off, and they look back to the 
inferno of the execution camps from the safe, peaceful present, they are baffled 
how they had been made to cross the dark river at all.   
 When Aue’s army-unit is ordered to execute not only the male Jews, but 
the complete Jewish population, they all respond with disbelief. A few officers 
asked to be transferred, but the majority submits to the Vernichtungsbefehl. Aue 
contemplates the order: 
 
Killing was a terrible thing; the reactions of the officers was a good proof that, 
even if they didn’t all draw the consequences of their own reactions; and the man 
for whom killing was not a terrible thing, killing an armed man as well as an 
unarmed man, and an unarmed man as well as a woman and her child, was 
nothing but an animal, unworthy of belonging to a community of men. But it was 
possible that this terrible thing was also a necessary thing; and in that case we had 
to submit to this necessity.21 
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It, then, takes only a small step to obey the horrific Vernichtungsbefehl: 
 
[I]f the supreme value is the Volk, the people to which one belongs, and if the will of this 




From the perspective of logic, Aue’s deduction is to be judged as a sample of 
impeccable reasoning. In conversation with a captive Soviet officer, Aue discusses 
the political systems of both countries. Both systems fight a ruthless battle in name 
of ideals such as freedom, community, labourer, and purity – and every act can be 
made out to accord with them: the most atrocious deed proved to be an act of 
mercy, inhumanity the highest form of self-sacrifice, and compliance with an order 
an act of freedom. Little’s narrative reveals the siren song of the iron logic of a 
system of thought, a logic that is able to justify all doings – at least for as long as 
we are on the level of abstract ideals and principles, from which point of view even 
the extermination of an entire people can be depicted as necessary. 
 But, and that is why Littell’s book is such a disturbing one, by writing from 
the perspective of the perpetrators, the obscene truth, which Aue impresses us at 
the start of the narrative, is inescapable: “I am a man like you. I tell you I am just 
like you!” These words are the words of Dr. Max Aue, but it could have been the 
words of Uncle Tom or Saïdja. And that is quite an unpleasant truth. Because for a 
while, we don’t object of being a poor black slave, or a young Javanese who is 
exploited, but we dare not be the Hauptsturmführer at the east front who seems 
to have lost all humanity. But this is also a man.23 And the answer on the question 





Littell’s book The Kindly Ones holds a peculiar paradox. For when Aue asserts to be 
a man like us, as anyone else, this statement undermines his own schematic 
Weltanschauung that consists of Über- and Untermenschen. His so-called 
superiority is based upon abstractions such as reason, morality, and civilization, 
which, despite their claim of universality, are translated into a local and exclusive 
idiom. One particular manifestation of man is raised to the standard – white, 
Christian, Germanic – and everything that deviates from this manifestation is 
considered to be inferior. But Aue’s meticulous observations clearly demonstrate 
that the perpetrators are not the Übermenschen they think they are, neither are 
the victims Untermenschen. Aue too draws this conclusion. His ideology proves to 
be void, and behind it yawns the abyss. 
 Littell’s The Kindly Ones succeeds where philosophical treaties on good and 
evil will fail: to reveal that we can never be sure not to be Dr. Max Aue if our fate 
would have been differently. That is literature’s paradox: it tells us the history of 
an individual, and through this, it exposes human nature behind the unique 
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manifestation, only richer and more complete than ever can be expressed in a 
formula. It exhibits that the Other – the Saïdja’s of the Dutch East Indies, the Uncle 
Tom’s of the young USA, and the Untermenschen of the Third Reich – are not a less 
sort of mankind. It reveals that we could have been Dr. Max Aue, when we subject 
ourselves to a system of thought without questioning the dichotomies that result 
from it, but that we are not a superior sort of mankind. We – the Droogstoppel’s, 
the slave-owners, the Dr. Max Aue’s – are just as they are. Literature exposes that 
there are, in fact, no Others.  
 That is the function of literature for law: that it preserves us from the 
depravation of doctrinal systems. The law too is a doctrinal system. But laws and 
treaties cannot guarantee our societies to be humane. Neither the high ideals of 
the human right treaties, nor the flawless constitutions are able to prevent that 
institutions such as Guantánamo Bay are established with an appeal to the same 
treaties and constitutions: every course of action can be made out to accord with 
them. That is another way of saying that a text needs a reader in order to get a 
meaning, and that it depends on the reader’s eye what is in the text. 
 If we are concerned about the human scale in law, we have to invest in a 
future generation of judges and officials. They shouldn’t merely study the law and 
the constitution, but also read non-legal books such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin, The Max 
Havelaar and The Kindly Ones. It doesn’t turn them into more skilful lawyers, but 
questions our conceptions of ‘we’ and ‘the others’ that lie at the bottom of legal 
classifications such as blasphemers, rebels, and terrorists. 
 
 
